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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JIM F. CRITTENDEN, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
ALPINE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 970091-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's final order 
granting summary judgment for defendant, denying summary judgment 
for plaintiff, and dismissing the case. Jurisdiction lies within 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996), as 
the appeal was poured over from the Supreme Court of Utah by 
order dated February 10, 1997. 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly hold that plaintiff's due 
process rights were not violated by the manner of his 
pretermination hearing? 
This issue was raised in the amended complaint's third cause 
of action (R. 570-69, 11 16-19).x The court granted summary 
!The district court paginated the record in this case 
forward from the last page of the original complaint, thereby 
numbering each document backward. For this reason, references to 
sequential pages of the record will run from higher to lower 
numbers. 
judgment for the school district on this issue in its September 
5, 1996 ruling (R. 589-85). 
Standard of Review: Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56, 
[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because 
entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, 
no deference is due the trial court's determination of 
the issues presented. However, [the reviewing court] 
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground 
available to the trial court, even if it is not one 
relied on below. 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]his nondeferential standard 
of review also applies to the threshold issue of whether there 
are no material issues of fact such that summary judgment is in 
order." Brown v. Weisr 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. Did the district court correctly conclude that 
plaintiff was not entitled to early retirement benefits? 
This issue was raised in the amended complaintf s fourth 
cause of action (R. 569-68, 11 20-27). The court granted summary 
judgment for the school district on this issue in its September 
5, 1996 ruling (R. 585-82). 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for this issue 
is the same as that cited above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained 
in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, Alpine School 
District, filed this action in January, 1993, alleging that in 
terminating his employment for misuse of school district 
resources, defendant had breached his contract of employment, 
terminated him in a wrongful manner, denied his right to due 
process of law, and wrongfully precluded him from early 
retirement (R. 6-1) . After the school district answered the 
complaint (R. 13-10), plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment (R. 119-18) supported by a memorandum (R. 129-20) and an 
affidavit (R. 134-30). The school district also filed a motion 
for summary judgment (R. 163-62) and supporting memorandum 
(R. 309-164). 
The district court held a hearing on the motions on August 
28, 1996 (R. 559, 613-6762) at which the court granted plaintiff 
leave to file an amended complaint (R. 671) . The amended 
complaint was filed on August 30, 1996 (R. 572-66), as was the 
school district's amended answer (R. 565-61), and a second 
hearing was held the same day (R. 577; R. 677-704). On September 
5, 1996, the district court entered a lengthy ruling granting 
summary judgment for the school district on all issues (R. 595-
80). The court filed a separate order and judgment dismissing 
2Unlike the other documents of record, the two hearing 
transcripts in this case are numbered sequentially from beginning 
to end. 
3 
the action on October 1, 1996 (R. 600-599). This appeal followed 
(R. 604-03). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Alpine School District 
who was serving in the administrative capacity of Director of 
Transportation at the time of his termination (R. 595, 11 1-2). 
On June 5, 1991, he met with Assistant Superintendent Gary 
Keetch, who questioned him about his use of district resources 
for private benefit (R. 594, 1 3). In reply to Mr. Keetchfs 
specific questions, plaintiff acknowledged using district 
resources to benefit himself and another employee (R. 594, 1 5). 
When asked whether he had used district resources to benefit his 
son, he replied "that this use of funds was a mistake" (±dU . At 
the end of the meeting, plaintiff was directed to go home and 
await the district's decision on a course of action (isLJ . 
Later that day, in a second meeting with Mr. Keetch, 
plaintiff was provided a letter which he read in Mr. Keetchfs 
presence (R. 594, H 6-7). The letter, signed by Susan Stone, 
another assistant superintendent, advised plaintiff that he was 
immediately suspended without pay and would be terminated 
effective fifteen days later (R. 594, 1 8; R. 275) . The letter 
further advised plaintiff of the procedure for obtaining a 
hearing in review of the termination decision (R. 594, 1 8; 
R. 275). Plaintiff sought post-termination review, and a day-
long hearing was held on September 23, 1991 (R. 594, 1 9). The 
termination was upheld the following month (R. 593, 1 10). 
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On June 6, 1991, the day after he received the termination 
letter, plaintiff notified the school district that he wanted to 
take early retirement under the district's policy no. 4752 
(R. 585; R. 274). The request was made after the deadline 
imposed by the policy (R. 585-84; R. 272). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Due process requires that before a public employee is 
terminated for cause, he must be given oral or written notice of 
the basis for termination and an opportunity to respond. These 
measures serve only as an initial check on mistaken decisions, 
ensuring that there are reasonable grounds to believe the basis 
to be true. Although plaintiff claims that his due process 
rights were violated by the school district's pretermination 
procedures, the undisputed evidence shows otherwise: before the 
district reached its termination decision, plaintiff met with an 
assistant superintendent, was questioned about three individual 
acts of misconduct, admitted to two of them, and asserted an 
explanation for the third. In a second meeting the same day, he 
was given a letter which specified the reasons for the 
termination decision and advised him of his right to post-
termination review. Pretermination due process demands no more. 
Qualification for early retirement under the school 
district's policy no. 4752 depends on meeting several 
requirements. Although, as plaintiff correctly asserts, he had 
the requisite age and experience to qualify, he did not notify 
5 
the district of his request for early retirement until June 6, 
1991, more than three months after the policy's mandatory March 1 
deadline. The school district denied the request, citing two 
grounds: the fact that plaintiff did not retire but was, in 
fact, suspended and under notification of involuntary termination 
for cause; and plaintiff's failure to comply with the March 1 
notification date. While the issue of timeliness was not 
addressed in the summary judgment memoranda, the court inquired 
about it in the August 28, 1996 hearing on the summary judgment 
motions, and it was the primary topic of a second hearing two 
days later. Therefore, any reliance on the issue by the district 
court was entirely appropriate. Moreover, because the record 
evidence supports a determination of untimeliness, this Court 
could affirm the lower court's decision on the basis of 
untimeliness even if the timeliness issue had been neither raised 
nor relied on below. 
The district court also found that plaintiff did not 
establish the applicability of the school district's early 
retirement policy to employees in his position: under suspension 
and facing termination. On appeal, plaintiff attempts to escape 
the court's interpretation of the policy by thrusting the burden 
on defendants to demonstrate that the policy does not apply in 
such cases. However, summary judgment requires a party to 
establish the existence of each element essential to its claim. 
Plaintiff's failure to show that the policy applies to employees 
who do not choose to retire but are terminated for cause is, like 
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his failure to meet the application deadline, necessarily 
dispositive of his claim. 
Because plaintiff has established neither a genuine issue of 
material fact nor legal error in the decision below, the school 
district is entitled to affirmance of the district court's 
summary judgment in its favor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SCHOOL BOARD'S PRETERMINATION PROCEDURES GAVE 
PLAINTIFF ALL THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTION TO WHICH HE 
WAS ENTITLED. 
As plaintiff correctly notes, the United States Supreme 
Court set out the essentials of pretermination due process in 
Cleveland Board of Education v. LoudermiU, 470 U.S. 532, 546 
(1985): "The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or 
written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the 
employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of 
the story." The district court concluded that the school 
district complied fully with these requirements. Plaintiff 
attacks the court's decision by claiming that genuine issues of 
material fact preclude summary judgment on this point. However, 
the undisputed facts fully support the district court's 
conclusion. 
Plaintiff argues that "[i]n this case there is a factual 
dispute as to whether Mr. Crittenden was given an opportunity to 
present his side of the story prior to termination" (Brief of 
Appellant at 7). However, his attack is directed not at the 
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facts themselves but at the legal conclusion the court drew from 
them. At no point has plaintiff contested the facts relevant to 
the court's decision: that he was asked whether he had used 
district resources for his own benefit, and he replied 
affirmatively; that he was asked whether he had used district 
resources to benefit another employee, and he replied 
affirmatively; and that he was asked whether he had used district 
resources to benefit his son, and he replied "that this use of 
funds was a mistake" (R. 594, 1 5). These admissions are well 
documented in plaintiff's own words. In a written statement 
dated June 5, 1991, plaintiff explained: 
Ifve reviewed Invoice No. 67379T--which I picked 
up myself and am responsible for--also no. 101396. 
The material used were [sic] purchased with an 
Alpine School dist[.] P.O. 
The material on P.0[.] No. 67379 was given to a 
Friend in need--Due to financial problems. He knew 
nothing about how I obtained it. 
The material obtained in P.O. 101396 I had planned 
to pay for--however due to my oversight--when I had the 
money--I didn't take care of it. No excuse--I'm 
responsible. 
The material in invoice 64453--was an honest 
mistake--I'd planned to [] Big A--when billed. 
These three matters are my responsible [sic]--I'll 
re-imburse the dist[.] & take what ever discipline I 
have coming--No excuses. 
R. 280-79. Further, in an affidavit, plaintiff admitted that in 
a June 5, 1991 meeting that lasted some 15 to 20 minutes (&££ 
R. 501, 1 3; R. 500, 1 6), 
Mr. Keetch asked me if I had used a purchase order to 
buy parts for my personal vehicle, an old Ford Bronco, 
and I told him yes. He asked me if I had used a couple 
of purchase orders to help Dave Beal on his personal 
vehicle, and I told him yes. 
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R. 500, 1 4. Plaintiff's statements, by themselves, show 
Loudermill1s requisites to have been met. 
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Powell v. Mikulecky. 891 
F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989), a case applying the Loudermill 
standard, is unconvincing. Powell, a fire fighter employed by 
Bartlesville, Oklahoma, had met with fire chiefs from neighboring 
jurisdictions to request that they not respond to his own 
department's requests for mutual aid until after all off-duty 
Bartlesville firemen had been cal]ed in for overtime. When the 
Bartlesville fire chief was advised of Powell's action, he 
confronted Powell and asked if he had met with the other fire 
chiefs, to which Powell responded with the single word, "Yes." 
Asked if he had requested them to decline signing the mutual aid 
agreement, he answered, "f [I]n the form that we heard it would 
be, yes.'1' Powell, 891 F.2d at 1455. The fire chief then 
informed Powell that he was discharged, effective immediately. 
After a subsequent question regarding the involvement of others, 
Powell refused to respond further until he consulted an attorney. 
The Tenth Circuit ruled that this terse exchange was sufficient 
to satisfy Loudermill. The court also held that Powell's 
admission of the allegations made disclosure of their evidentiary 
basis irrelevant and rendered an opportunity for further 
explanation by Powell meaningless, as it "would not have 
contributed to the prevention of an erroneous termination." 
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1459. The pretermination due process given 
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plaintiff in this case, as shown by the evidence of record, was 
greater than that accorded in Powell. 
Plaintiff claims that Powell's refusal to respond to further 
inquiries distinguishes Powell from the present case, 
demonstrating that Powell, unlike plaintiff, was afforded an 
opportunity to tell his side of the story but chose to end the 
discussion. However, a close reading of the case does not 
support plaintifffs contention. After admitting to the 
questioned conduct, Powell was terminated effective immediately. 
Only after terminating Powell did the fire chief attempt to 
elicit additional information that bore on matters other than 
Powell's own culpability, resulting in Powell's refusal to 
continue the discussion. As in Powell, plaintiff here was asked 
about his questionable behavior and given an opportunity to 
respond. He admitted to two incidents and offered an explanation 
for the third. This exchange took place in the context of a 
fifteen-to-twenty minute meeting at the end of which, unlike 
Powell, plaintiff was not immediately terminated but asked to go 
home until the district decided on an appropriate course of 
action. Later that day, plaintiff, again unlike Powell, had a 
second meeting at which he was given a letter (R. 275) specifying 
the reasons for the school district's actions and placing him on 
suspension without pay pending termination in fifteen days. 
Moreover, the letter advised him of his right to a full post-
termination hearing and the procedure for obtaining it. The 
school district's actions more than fulfilled the purpose of a 
10 
pretermination hearing as established by Loudermill: to serve as 
"an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a 
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the charges against the employee are true and support the 
proposed action." Loudermill. 470 U.S. at 545-46. 
Plaintiff's effort to distinguish Kelly v. Smith. 764 F.2d 
1412 (11th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by McKinney V. 
£a£j&, 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994), is also unavailing. Rather 
than admitting his misconduct--failure to respond to a standby 
call--Kelly attempted to excuse it by claiming he was not 
scheduled to work standby, and further refused to work standby 
duty for the rest of the week despite the direction of his 
supervisor, whose duties included scheduling standby coverage. 
The supervisor warned Kelly that refusal to work the scheduled 
standby would result in his termination, but Kelly declined 
standby duty and left the worksite. He was subsequently given 
oral notice of his termination. The Eleventh Circuit held that 
Kelly's pretermination due process was not violated. Like Kelly, 
plaintiff in the case at bar was confronted with his misconduct 
and given the opportunity to deny or excuse it--the precise due 
process measures that Loudermill demands. That he admitted, 
rather than resisted, his employer's allegations has no bearing 
on the sufficiency of his pretermination due process. 
The fact that the terminated employees in the two other 
cases plaintiff mentions received more lengthy pretermination 
hearings is without the significance plaintiff attempts to place 
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on it (&££ Brief of Appellant at 9). So long as the criteria of 
Loudermill are fulfilled, the length of the pretermination 
hearing is irrelevant. There is little point in prolonging a 
pretermination interview when misconduct is admitted. As the 
Powell court explained, 
The pretermination hearing is merely the 
employee's chance to clarify the most basic 
misunderstandings or to convince the employer that 
termination is unwarranted. The pretermination hearing 
is intended to supplement, not duplicate, the more 
elaborate post-termination hearing. Because the post-
termination hearing is where the definitive fact-
finding occurs, there is an obvious need for more 
formal due process protections at that point. To 
duplicate those protections at the pretermination stage 
would cause unnecessary delay and expense while 
diffusing the responsibility for the ultimate decision 
to terminate an employee. The idea of conducting two 
identical hearings runs counter to traditional 
principles of adjudication. 
Powell, 891 F.2d at 1458. 
Plaintiff's position on appeal is much like that of the 
plaintiff in Horgan v. Industrial Design Corp., 657 p.2d 751 
(Utah 1982). Horgan signed a release waiving all claims arising 
from an employment relationship. He later filed suit, seeking 
additional termination compensation. The court stated that 
"[t]he movant is entitled to summary judgment only if he is 
'entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' on the undisputed 
facts. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c)." Horgan, 657 P.2d at 752. 
Observing that Horgan "attempts to create a factual dispute as to 
the signing of the release by alleging that he signed under 
duress" (isL. at 753), the court noted that the facts underlying 
the duress claim were undisputed, leaving only a question of law 
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as to whether they constituted duress. In the present case, the 
facts underlying plaintiff's due process claim are also 
undisputed, leaving only the question of whether those facts 
constitute a denial of plaintiff's due process rights. As 
LQudermill and 2QM£ll show, they do not. 
Plaintiff's failure to show any genuine issue of material 
fact or error in the district court's application of law entitles 
the school district to affirmance of the summary judgment in its 
favor on plaintiff's due process claim. 
II. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO EARLY RETIREMENT 
BECAUSE HE DID NOT MAKE TIMELY APPLICATION FOR IT. 
Plaintiff's claim to early retirement benefits rests solely 
on the school district's policy no. 4752 (£££ R. 569-68, 11 20-
27). Under paragraph 1.7 of the policy, "[a]dministrators 
wishing to retire early must make application to the 
superintendent of schools by March 1, of the year they elect to 
retire" (R. 165). Plaintiff's request for early retirement, a 
letter to the superintendent, was dated June 6, 1991, and stamped 
as received in the superintendent's office the following day 
(R. 274). This tardy notification does not meet the policy's 
mandatory deadline. 
Rather than showing that he made a timely application for 
early retirement benefits, plaintiff attempts to avoid the policy 
deadline by arguing that the school district waived any argument 
based on timeliness by not raising it as a defense, by not 
arguing it in the summary judgment memorandum, and by stating 
"that timeliness was not the reason why Mr. Crittenden's benefits 
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were denied" (Brief of Appellant at 12) . However, the evidence 
of record does not support plaintiff's waiver theory. 
"Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage; (2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an 
intention to relinquish the right." Soter's. Inc. v. Daseret 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 940 {Utah 1993). Further, 
"the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct." Id. at 942. 
Although the supreme court rejected as separate and additional 
requirements that the party's actions or conduct "'must evince in 
some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must be 
inconsistent with any other intent'" (isL. at 940) {quoting Hunter 
v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983)) (emphasis added in 
Soter's, Inc.), it found these phrases merely redundant 
elaborations of the necessary showing of intent (&££ 857 P.2d at 
941). Because the school district's actions in the district 
court were, in fact, inconsistent with an intent to waive the 
untimeliness of plaintiff's request as a defense, plaintiff 
cannot show a distinct intent to relinquish it. 
Plaintiff's waiver argument is largely based on the school 
district's response to his interrogatory no. 26 (£££ Brief of 
Appellant at 12-13) .3 As the school district pointed out below 
(&££ R. 682-85), it is necessary to place the response in the 
context of the questions being asked. Interrogatory no. 25 
3It is of note that the materials contained in Appendices A 
and B to plaintiff's brief are not of record in the case below. 
However, as both interrogatory no. 25 and interrogatory no. 26 
were discussed in the August 30, 1996 hearing, the school 
district raises no objection to their inclusion. 
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requested the school district to "[s]et forth all facts upon 
which defendant relies to substantiate its denial of paragraph 21 
of plaintiff's Complaint, wherein it is alleged that the 
defendant has failed and refused to allow the plaintiff to apply 
for early retirement, which allegation the defendant has denied" 
(Brief of Appellant at App. A, 5). The school district 
responded, 
Defendant never stopped plaintiff from applying for 
early retirement. Plaintiff has failed to prove 
otherwise. Without waiving its position as to whether 
plaintiff was entitled to so-called early retirement, 
defendant, through Assistant Superintendent Dr. Susan 
Stone, sent plaintiff, because he specifically 
requested them, the forms that constitute an employee's 
application for early retirement. Also, the District 
made it clear to plaintiff that it would cooperate in 
any way possible to facilitate Mr. Crittenden's drawing 
out his normal state retirement from the state 
retirement office. However, it was the position of the 
District that plaintiff did not qualify for the 
District's early retirement policy since his employment 
ceased as a result of a job action initiated against 
him by the District. 
Brief of Appellant at App. B, 13. As a follow-up to this 
question, plaintiff asked the school district to "[s]tate whether 
or not the plaintiff has, in fact, filled out a form for early 
retirement" (Brief of Appellant at App. A, 5). In response, the 
school district emphasized that whether or not he had filled out 
the proper form was not at issue because he had foregone his 
early retirement opportunity by engaging in criminal conduct: 
As indicated in the preceding interrogatory, the 
appropriate forms to apply for such early retirement 
were requested by plaintiff; the defendant, through 
Assistant Superintendent Stone, mailed these forms to 
the plaintiff; and the forms were never sent back to 
Dr[.] Stone's knowledge. However, this was not 
dispositive of the District's decision to deny 
15 
plaintifffs request to participate in the District 
early retirement program. The plaintiff, by himself 
and through his attorney, communicated to defendant his 
desire to participate in the District early retirement 
program, and the District was well enough aware of this 
desire. Defendant's denial of plaintiff's 
participation in this early retirement program was not 
due to any imagined irregularity with respect to 
whether the forms were properly filled out, and the 
defendant objects to and deplores any insinuation on 
the part of the plaintiff to suggest that defendant 
denied plaintiff early retirement due to a clerical 
oversight in the filling out of forms. As communicated 
over and over to plaintiff and his attorney by 
defendant and its attorney in 1991, plaintiff failed to 
qualify for district early retirement because his 
employment was involuntarily terminated due to criminal 
acts. 
Brief of Appellant at App. B, 13-14. The interrogatory did not 
ask about, and consequently the response did not address, the 
timeliness of plaintiff's request. However, as the supreme court 
has recognized, "' [m]ere silence is not a waiver unless there is 
some duty or obligation to speak.'" Soter'sr Inc. r 857 P.2d at 
940 (quoting Plateau Mining Co. v, Div. of State Lands and 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 730 (Utah 1990)) (alteration in Soter's. 
Inc.). The interrogatory simply did not put plaintiffs on a duty 
to speak on the issue of timeliness. 
To the extent that plaintiff relies on the lack of reference 
to untimeliness in the school district's answer and motion for 
summary judgment, the supreme court's observation that silence 
does not constitute waiver is equally applicable. Plaintiff has 
not shown untimeliness under the policy to be an affirmative 
defense waived unless explicitly pleaded, nor has he shown that 
failure to raise it in a motion for summary judgment precludes 
the trial court from raising it sua sponte and the parties from 
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arguing it at the court!s behest, as happened in this case. In 
the August 28, 1996 hearing on summary judgment, the court 
remarked, "The policy on its face says that, 'administrators 
wishing to retire early must make their election by March l.1 
That's Section 1.7" (R. 657). The following exchange ensued: 
MR. PETERSEN: Okay, let me address that issue, 
your Honor. We asked them specifically that in an 
interrogatory, and they said that it didn't apply. 
That is not the reason he was denied early retirement. 
They said in an answer to interrogatory the reason 
we're denying early retirement is because he was 
terminated for cause. 
THE COURT: So you think that I should ignore 
Section 1.7 because you believe they are actually 
ignoring 1.7? 
MR. PETERSEN: Correct. 
R. 657-58. In the hearing, plaintiff's counsel did not specify 
the interrogatory to which he was referring. 
Rather than responding immediately, the school district's 
attorney returned to his office to review the answers to 
plaintiff's interrogatories (R. 681/. As he explained to the 
court in the subsequent hearing, 
So what happened is yesterday afternoon or 
yesterday morning I started reviewing all the answers 
to interrogatories. I couldn't figure out which one 
counsel was talking about. I called counsel on the 
phone, and he told me he was referring to interrogatory 
No. 26. So you can see there, your Honor, it's tab No. 
3. 
I read it through, and at that point I determined 
that the Court was misinformed [by plaintiff's 
counsel]. And so that's when I got on the line with 
the Court, and that's why we're having this hearing. 
R. 682. He then proceeded to explain the response to 
interrogatory no. 26 in detail (R. 682-85), and concluded, 
Now I guess counsel is reasoning from that 
interrogatory answer that somehow we had waived the 
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March 1st deadline, but what we did again, is we said, 
"We1re not getting hung up on the fact that you never 
filled out a form." We didn't waive the March 1st 
issue. We didn't say, "We're not hung up on the fact 
that you didn't file by March 1st, [*] and we reiterated 
that the reason we let you go was because you were 
terminated.[] 
Now maybe counsel can argue that that was--that he 
can say, "Well, you didn't affirmatively say that 
you--you didn't affirmatively refer to the March 1 
issue." Well, your Honor, that does not constitute a 
waiver, and that's what I wanted to get before the 
Court today. 
Because the Court has focused on this issue and 
because of the way the discussion has developed as we 
have argued this motion, I think it's appropriate to 
look at that issue. 
R. 685-86. Plaintiff's counsel was given a full opportunity to 
respond, but chose not to directly address the timeliness issue 
(R. 690-93) . 
As this Court has held, an appellate court "may affirm the 
trial court's ruling on any proper ground as long as there is 
evidence in the record supporting such an affirmance." State v. 
MontQya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah App. 1997); accord White v. 
Deseelhorstr 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994). In addition to the 
hearing transcripts cited above, other evidence of record in this 
case supports affirmance of the district court's decision that 
plaintiff's request for early retirement benefits was untimely. 
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the district 
included its response to plaintiff's request for early retirement 
benefits, a letter from the superintendent dated June 25, 1991. 
The letter stated as follows: 
This letter will inform you of the Alpine School 
District's intention to deny your request for early 
retirement benefits and supplemental health insurance 
benefits as provided in Policies #4750 and #4752. It 
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is the district's position that you are ineligible for 
either of the benefits under the express terms of the 
policies. These benefits are available only to 
retiring employees, and you did not retire but were 
suspended and notified of involuntary termination for 
cause. In addition, you failed to comply with the 
District's application procedure for the granting of 
early retirement benefits in that you did not notify 
the District by March l. Also, with respect to 
supplemental health insurance benefits, you have not 
yet attained age 65. For these reasons the District 
has determined to deny both of your requests. 
R. 272 (emphasis supplied). Moreover, in his deposition, the 
superintendent was asked if he was still relying on the March 1 
deadline as one of the reasons for denial of early retirement 
benefits and responded, "fIn some measure, but I will say that it 
does not have the weight for me that it did at that time1" 
(R. 680). Even this qualified answer demonstrates that at the 
time the school district made its determination, plaintiff!s 
failure to meet the March 1 deadline was a significant reason for 
the denial. That it has since been overshadowed in importance by 
plaintiff's criminal conduct does not make it less so. 
In short, it is clear from the record that the timeliness of 
plaintiff's request for early retirement benefits was at issue 
below; it is also clear that the undisputed evidence shows the 
request to have been untimely. Plaintiff has provided no 
authority for his proposition that the district court was not 
entitled to rely on this ground as dispositive and has failed to 
demonstrate that the school district had a distinct intent to 
waive the issue. These facts warrant affirmance of the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on this issue for the school 
district. 
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III. PLAINTIFF DOES NOT HAVE A VESTED RIGHT OR 
PROTECTABLE PROPERTY INTEREST IN EARLY RETIREMENT 
BENEFITS UNDER POLICY NO. 4752. 
Plaintiff advances several additional theories to justify 
his claimed entitlement to early retirement benefits under policy 
no. 4752. He argues that his right to benefits became vested by 
virtue of his age and years of service alone. He contends that 
the policy does not explicitly exclude employees terminated for 
criminal conduct. He alleges a lack of due process prior to the 
denial of benefits. Finally, he asserts that the district 
court's decision amounts to judicial legislation. Each of these 
arguments is without merit. 
Although he characterizes his right to early retirement as 
Vested/ plaintiff neither defines the term nor cites to 
authorities which do. Research has disclosed no Utah cases 
scrutinizing the word's meaning. However, according to Black1S 
Law Dictionary, Vested" means 
[f]ixed; accrued; settled; absolute; complete. Having 
the character or given the rights of absolute 
ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated 
by a condition precedent. Rights are Vested" when 
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become 
property of some particular person or persons as 
present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, 
or contingent interest in property founded on 
anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not 
constitute Vested right." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1563 (6th ed. 1990). A Vested pension" 
is one in which 
an employee (or his or her estate) has rights to all 
the benefits purchased with the employer's 
contributions to the plan even if the employee is not 
employed by this employer at the time of retirement. 
One in which the right to be paid is not subject to 
20 
forfeiture if the employment relationship terminates 
before the employee retires. 
Id. Under these definitions, plaintiff's claim must fail. 
Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence of record disputing 
that his right to early retirement benefits is contingent or 
subject to defeat by a condition precedent, such as application 
by the mandatory deadline (£££ discussion in Point II, above). 
He has not shown that the right to early retirement benefits had 
become his property as a present interest prior to his suspension 
and termination. At most, he has shown that policy no. 4752 gave 
him a right to apply for early retirement benefits--an 
opportunity in which the school district fully cooperated, 
providing the appropriate forms at plaintiff's request. See 
Brief of Appellant at Appendix B, 13-14. 
Moreover, plaintiff has not shown, nor can he show, that 
policy no. 4752 is a vested pension plan as defined above. There 
is no evidence that the employer made contributions to a plan or 
purchased benefits pursuant to the policy. Likewise, there is no 
evidence that an employee is entitled to benefits under the 
policy even if he no longer works for the school district at the 
time of retirement; in fact, the policy's language contradicts 
such an interpretation. Section 1.1 targets long-term 
administrators "who find it increasingly difficult to continue 
their employment with the district" (R. 165; emphasis supplied) 
and states, "This policy is adopted to provide these 
administrators an opportunity to retire early" (idLJ At the time 
plaintiff made his request, he was under unpaid suspension 
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pending termination. Because his employment could not have 
continued under these circumstances, he "is not the type of 
employee for whom this policy was implemented" (R. 583) , as the 
court correctly held. Consequently, any right to benefits under 
the policy was subject to forfeiture on termination, unlike a 
vested benefit. It is the element of vesting that differentiates 
early retirement under policy no. 4752 from the state retirement 
pension that plaintiff is currently receiving, and from the 
retirement benefits at issue in the three cases plaintiff cites 
to support his argument. Each of these cases is distinguishable 
from the case at bar. 
In Auerbach's. Inc. v. Kimball. 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977), 
Kimball had been promised a pension of $50.00 per month for life 
on fulfilling only two conditions: 20 years of employment with 
Auerbachfs, and continued employment with the company until age 
65. The court analyzed the promise as a unilateral contract 
fulfilled by performance of the conditions, reversed the summary 
judgment in favor of Auerbach's, and remanded the case for trial. 
In the present case, there is no promise of a fixed benefit 
simply on reaching a given age and length of service; instead, 
there is an opportunity to apply for benefits in lieu of 
continuing employment, based on a timely notification that 
plaintiff neglected to make. Plaintiff does not stand in the 
same position as employee Kimball. 
The remaining two cases are also inapposite. Schofield v. 
Zion's Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934), 
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does not address pending benefits but the diminution of benefits 
already fixed by written agreement and being paid to retirees, in 
contrast to plaintiff's circumstances, Ellis v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 757 p.2d 882 (Utah App. 1988), a££!d, 783 p.2d 
540 (Utah 1989), deals with disability retirement benefits. In 
determining that Ellis had no vested right to benefits, the court 
reviewed the supreme court's analysis of vested rights in Driggs 
v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 417, 142 P.2d 
657 (Utah 1943). The issue in Driggs, as in Schofielfl, was 
whether an employer--this time, the state--could unilaterally 
reduce the amount of a pension for which Driggs had already 
qualified and which he was receiving on a continuing basis. The 
Ellis court summarized the supreme court's position in Driggs as 
follows: 
an employee who receives a mere gratuitous allowance 
awarded for appreciation of past services has no vested 
rights in the allowance and it is terminable at will. 
On the other hand, when a retired employee had made the 
requisite contributions and had satisfied all 
conditions precedent to his benefits, then the employee 
had a "vested right" in his retirement benefits as 
provided by the statute at the time of his retirement 
and a subsequent amendment could not reduce the amount 
of benefits to which the employee was entitled. 
Ellis, 757 P.2d at 886 (citation omitted). Plaintiff's truncated 
quotation of this language for the general proposition that an 
employee has a vested right to benefits when he has fulfilled all 
conditions precedent (see Brief of Appellant at 10) fails to 
distinguish between his circumstances and the divestiture of an 
ongoing benefit that Driggs addressed, as well as ignoring the 
necessity of a timely application as a condition precedent to 
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receiving the early retirement benefits to which plaintiff lays 
claim. Further, unlike Driggs, plaintiff made no contributions 
to the plan under which he maintains a right to benefits. 
Plaintiffls asserted denial of due process before early 
retirement benefits were denied is improperly raised for the 
first time on appeal. No due process claim with respect to these 
benefits was articulated in the court below. "To preserve a 
substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring the issue 
to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Assocs. v. 
Rebel Enters.r 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah App. 1991) (footnote 
omitted) ; see also Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 
P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990) ("With limited exceptions, the practice 
of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised 
for the first time on appeal"); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 77 
(Utah App. 1990) ("As the Utah appellate courts have reiterated 
many times, we generally will not consider an issue, even a 
constitutional one, which the appellant raises on appeal for the 
first time") . Moreover, as established above, plaintiff has 
failed to show a protectible property interest to which due 
process applies. 
Finally, plaintiff argues that it is not the court's proper 
function to construe policy no. 4752 expansively to protect the 
school district. In doing so, he ignores clear precedent giving 
latitude to a school district's interpretation of its own policy. 
24 
As the supreme court stated just last year in E.M. v. Briggs. 922 
P.2d 754 (Utah 1996), 
On two prior occasions, we have discussed the 
latitude a reviewing court should give a school board's 
interpretation of its own policies. In Elwell v. Board 
of Education, 626 P.2d 460, 463 (Utah 1981), we stated: 
It should be here noted that the management, 
supervision and determinations of policy are the 
prerogative and the responsibility of the school 
officials; and that the courts should be reluctant 
to enter therein; and indeed should not do so 
unless it is shown that the complainant was in 
some manner deprived of due process of law, or 
that the action of the board was so entirely 
without justification thnt it must be deemed 
capricious and arbitrary. 
(Footnote omitted.) We reached the same result in 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Board of Education, 797 P.2d 
412, 413-14 (Utah 1990), stating, "fIt is the policy of 
the law not to favor limitations on the powers of 
[boards of education], but rather to give [them] a free 
hand to function within the sphere of [their] 
responsibilities.1" Id. at 414 (quoting Ricker v. 
Board of Educ, 16 Utah 2d 106, 110-11, 396 P.2d 416, 
420 (1964)) . 
E.M.e 922 P.2d at 757. The court applied this latitude to uphold 
the school district's reasonable interpretation of its own policy 
as permitting use of a disciplinary sanction that was not 
specified in the policy but fell within the range of severity 
defined by the policy's extremes. 
Plaintiff has identified no language in policy no. 4752 that 
explicitly or implicitly permits early retirement to one whose 
continued employment has already been rejected for misconduct. 
By contrast, it is implicit in the policy that the qualifying 
employee could continue to work if he chose to do so: section 
1.3.1 is directed to those who meet plaintiff's age and service 
requirements and "choose to retire early" (R. 165). One who, 
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like plaintiff, is under suspension and pending termination is no 
longer in a position to elect early retirement. For the court to 
construe the policy against the school district's reasonable 
interpretation to include employees being terminated for cause 
would be to engage in the very judicial legislation that 
plaintiff deplores. 
Because plaintiff has failed to show vesting of or 
entitlement to early retirement benefits under policy no. 4752, 
the district court's summary judgment for the school district on 
this issue merits this Court's affirmance. 
CONCLUSION 
In terminating plaintiff's employment, the school district 
gave him oral notice of the reasons for the proposed termination 
and an opportunity to respond to them. Plaintiff admitted to 
misappropriating district funds in two instances, and offered an 
explanation for the third. After considering the matter further, 
the district provided plaintiff with a letter placing him on 
unpaid suspension pending termination, advising him of the 
reasons for its action, and informing him of the procedure for 
obtaining further review. Due process requires nothing more. 
The school district relied on both plaintiff's criminal 
misconduct and the untimeliness of his notification that he 
desired early retirement in denying him benefits under policy no. 
4752. Plaintiff has not demonstrated timely notice. Nor has he 
shown the district's interpretation of its policy to be arbitrary 
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or capricious; rather, its language implicitly requires that an 
employee be qualified to continue employment in order to obtain 
early retirement benefits. Because plaintiff was incapable of 
continuing his employment due to his suspension and pending 
termination, the denial of benefits is fully warranted by policy. 
For these reasons, as more fully explained above, Alpine 
School district respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in its favor. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant does not believe oral argument is necessary to the 
proper disposition of this case. However, defendant wishes to 
participate if oral argument is ordered by the Court. Defendant 
does not request a published opinion. 
Dated this | */ IL day of August, 1997. 
Nancy a. Kemp 
Assistant Attorney General 
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